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Abstract Money demand stability is a crucial issue for monetary policy efficacy,
and it is particularly endangered when substantial changes occur in the monetary
system. By implementing the ARDL technique, this study intends to estimate the
impact of money demand determinants in Italy over a long period (1861–2011) and
to investigate the stability of the estimated relations. We show that instability cannot
be excluded when a standard money demand function is estimated, irrespectively of
the use of M1 or M2. Then, we argue that the reason for possible instability resides
in the omission of relevant variables, as we show that a fully stable demand for
narrow money (M1) can be obtained from an augmented money demand function
involving real exchange rate and its volatility as additional explanatory variables.
These results also allow us to argue that narrower monetary aggregates should be
employed in order to obtain a stable estimated relation.
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1 Introduction
The function of the demand for money is one of the most investigated
macroeconomic relations. This large interest derives from the fact that stability of
money demand plays a crucial role in the conduct of monetary policy and it also
reflects the importance attributed to money demand stability in theoretical
modelling.
As stated by Milton Friedman: «the quantity theory is in the first instance a
theory of the demand for money», and the «quantity theorists accepted the empirical
hypothesis that the demand for money is highly stable» (Friedman 1969, pp. 98,
108). Friedman’s statements imply that there is a stable demand function that is a
stable relationship between income, price level, relative rates of return, and money
demand.
Moreover, the stability of money demand represents a fundamental assumption to
adopt monetary targeting. Central banks can implement monetary manoeuvres on
the basis of the estimated relations between money demand and its determinants;
then, a stable money demand function is considered as a necessary condition for the
use of monetary aggregates in the conduct of monetary policy. In the presence of an
unstable function, it is not possible, in fact, to postulate a constant conditional model
for money demand.
Poole (1970) argues that in the presence of an unstable money demand, the target
of monetary policy should be the interest rate. Following this reasoning, many
central banks switched from monetary aggregates to the interest rate as their target
in the 1970s, when money instability increased sharply. However, regardless of the
monetary instrument, money still plays an important role in the formulation of an
efficient policy strategy, because money demand instability implies an unsta-
ble money multiplier, preventing any possibility of forecasting the effects of
monetary policies.
In this paper we study money demand in Italy in the period 1861–2011 by
investigating both its determinants and its stability. Italy represents an interesting
case because its monetary system has undergone several economic, social, and
institutional changes (Fratianni and Spinelli 1997). For a century and a half, Italy
has had different monetary regimes, has adhered to diverse exchange rate systems,
and has experienced changes in the financial regulation framework. These are all
factors that can influence the demand for money (Boughton 1992). In addition, in
this long period, the country has experienced twelve banking crises, as well as
several financial turmoils and episodes of high inflation (De Bonis and Silvestrini
2014).
The stability of money demand in Italy has been analysed in other studies (see,
for instance, Thornton 1998; Caruso 2006; Muscatelli and Spinelli 1996, 2000).
With respect to the existing literature, the present paper examines a longer period
that covers all the relevant changes occurred in the Italian monetary policy regime
and financial system, including a decade of the euro circulation. In order to do so,
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we reconstruct the time series for two monetary aggregates (M1 and M2), inflation,
real effective exchange rate (REEX) and exchange rate volatility, by merging
different existing series and by means of our own calculations. The reconstructed
series are then used together with the existing series for GDP and short-term interest
rate, allowing us to cover such a long period of time with an extensive analysis of
money demand determinants. The empirical analysis is conducted by using the
autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) methodology in order to differentiate
between long- and short-run effects on money demand by its determinants. Then,
we investigate the stability of the estimated relations by means of the CUSUM and
CUSUM of squares tests. The analysis is performed on M2, which is the standard
aggregate considered to measure money demand, but also focuses on the narrow
money aggregate, M1, in order to isolate money demand from other portfolio
choices. We adopt two different money demand equations. Firstly, money demand
is analysed with the GDP, inflation, and short-term interest rate as its determinants.
Secondly, we augment this specification by including REEX and its variability as
additional explanatory variables.
Our results show that instability cannot be excluded when a standard money
demand function is estimated for Italy, irrespectively of the use of M1 or M2 as
proxies. Furthermore, we demonstrate that despite the fact that the period of
multiple banks of issue (from 1861 to 1893) seems to be characterised by a
stable money demand in Italy, the period of development of the banking and
financial system (from the beginning of the century till the 1930s), characterised by
the strong shift from coins to paper money and bank deposits, and the following
sharp increase in price levels and World War I, present an unstable money demand
till up the end of the World War II (1945). Then, we argue that the reason for
possible instability resides in omission of relevant variables. This allows us to show
that fully stable demand for narrow money (M1) in Italy can be obtained with an
augmented money demand function, involving REEX and its volatility as additional
explanatory variables. As the same does not apply to the estimation of M2, we also
conclude that narrower monetary aggregate should be employed as the proxy for
money demand in order to obtain stable estimated relations.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 highlights the main historical events
in monetary regimes and policies that potentially could have affected the demand
for money in Italy. Section 3 synthesises the main results in the literature related to
our analysis. Section 4 describes the methodologies employed and reports the main
results obtained. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Money demand in Italy in a historical perspective
2.1 The first period: multiple banks of issue
The Italian unification proceeded through the annexation and acquisition of the pre-
unification states by the small Kingdom of Sardinia. In 1861 the Kingdom of Italy was
proclaimed, even though national unification was not completed yet. Then, the Papal
State was annexed in 1870, while Friuli, Alto Adige, and Istria were incorporated only
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after the World War I. The new Italian Kingdom inherited the monetary and banking
systems from old constituent states; therefore, the political unification posed the
complex problem of the monetary and financial unification (Toniolo et al. 2003;
Pecorari 2015). In 1861 it was decreed the legal tender of the Piedmontese silver
lira—renamed Italian lira—and established an exchange ratio for the old currencies
that were still in circulation. The adopted model, analogous to the French one, was
based on bimetallism, with a fixed rate between gold and silver at 1/15.5, and
convertibility of paper notes in metal coins. The first fundamental law for the
monetary and financial unification, enacted in 1862, created a single currency (the
Italian lira) that substituted the old moneys. Furthermore, a single coinage system was
put in place (Giordano 2011; Toniolo 2011). In 1865, Italy, Belgium, France, and
Switzerland signed an agreement to form the Latin Monetary Union, joined by Greece
in 1868. The main economic objectives pursued by the agreement were the
elimination of conversion costs in foreign exchange transactions and the reduction of
international reserves. Given the characteristics of the Latin Monetary Union,
however, these objectives were not achieved (Fratianni and Spinelli 1997).
The banknotes issuance remained fragmented, as the banks of issue operating in
the pre-unitarian states maintained their right to issue. In the period 1861–1870, in
the Kingdom of Italy, five banks of issue operated: the Banca Nazionale degli Stati
Sardi;1 the Banca Nazionale Toscana; the Banca Toscana di Credito; the Banco di
Napoli; and the Banco di Sicilia. Then, from 1870 to 1893 the banks of issue were
six, as the Banca Romana joined the other five (Canovai 1911; Cardarelli 1990).
This period, in which multiple banks of issue operated, is of particular theoretical
interest: the Italian experience has been, in fact, considered as an example of a
competitive system on money issuance (Gianfreda and Janson 2001).
Competition among banks of issue does not imply in itself a problem of monetary
control, even though, in the case of Italy, the regime of competition was blamed for
the financial crises of 1866 and 1893. The high Italian foreign debt, the increasing
public debt, and the imminent war against Austria were the main causes of the 1866
financial turmoil. In order to finance the war, on the 1 May 1866, the Government
by a decree required the Banca Nazionale nel Regno to provide the Treasury with a
loan of 250 million liras and in return, suspended the convertibility of its banknotes
(corso forzoso) (Canovai 1911; Gigliobianco and Giordano 2012). The gold and
silver coins, still widely in use, were hoarded and disappeared from circulation,
while paper money began to spread among the population. The 1866 decree
introduced a fundamental asymmetry between the Banca Nazionale nel Regno and
the other banks of issue. Only the Banca Nazionale emitted fiat money, while the
banknotes issued by other institutions could be redeemed into notes of the Banca
Nazionale. Since these last ones became monetary base, there was an increase in
overall money circulation (Gianfreda and Mattesini 2015). In 1893, a deep
economic and financial crisis culminated in the liquidation of the two main
commercial banks, in the bankruptcy of others, and in the liquidation of the Banca
Romana, involved in a political and financial scandal (Pecorari 2015). In the same
year, the Bank of Italy was created with the merger of the two Tuscany Banks of
1 In 1867, the Banca Nazionale degli Stati Sardi took the name of Banca Nazionale nel Regno d’Italia.
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issue and the Banca Nazionale. Although the Banco di Napoli and the Banco di
Sicilia maintained their issue rights up till 1926, the Bank of Italy became the
central bank of the country.
Figure 1 illustrates the money circulation and bank deposits from 1861 to 1915.
We see how, at the time of unification, money stock was largely composed by metal
coins that represented 90 % of total money in circulation. Paper notes started to gain
wider acceptance only after 1866 when Italy exited from the gold standard.
Nevertheless, as shown by Fig. 1, metal coins circulation remained significant until
the First World War, when the issuance of paper notes notably increased.
Analogously, at the time of unification, the value of banks deposits was negligible.
Banks deposits increased as banking system grew significantly in the Italian regions,
acquiring confidence among people. In brief, as the financial and banking systems
evolved, the composition of money progressively shifted from coins to paper money
and bank deposits (Fratianni and Spinelli 1984, 1997).
Before the World War I, the convertibility of paper money into gold was
maintained in the following periods: 1861–1866; 1882–1885; 1902–1914. In the
period 1861–1893, the competition among note issuers worked well. In particular,
despite the legislative interventions aimed at favouring the Banca Nazionale nel
Regno and the suspension of convertibility of its notes between 1866 and 1874,
competition acted as a discipline device on the dominant bank (Gianfreda and
Mattesini 2015). In the gold standard adherence periods, convertibility acted as a
discipline for monetary issue. In other periods, the Government exerted its control
with policies that imposed limits in the issue of paper money and in minimum
reserve ratios. In addition, the Government controlled the official discount rate of
the banks of issue. This system, however, did not avoid the situation when the limits
of issuance of bank notes were exceeded, partially due the fact that banks of issue
were at the same time commercial banks (Muscatelli and Spinelli 2000). After the
World War I, Italy returned to the gold standard in the period 1927–1930.
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Fig. 1 Metal coins, paper notes, and bank deposits 1861–1915. In 1000s of current euros. Source:
ISTAT, Serie storiche, online database
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2.2 From the 1930s onwards
Similar to other countries, also Italy was affected by the Great Depression. Between
1929 and 1932, the industrial output fell by 25.1 %. Given the tight interrelation-
ships between banks and industry, the slump had an immediate impact on the
banking sector that became illiquid, threatening the stability of both the financial
system and the real economy (Toniolo 1995; Gigliobianco and Giordano 2012). The
Government intervened and defined a new regulatory framework. In 1933, the
holding companies were permanently separated from the parent banks and their
assets were taken over by the newly created state holding, the Istituto di
Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI). The new Banking Act of 1936, a legislation that
remained in force until 1993, profoundly reformed the banking system. Firstly, the
Bank of Italy was defined as a public institution, and deposit-taking and credit
activities were considered public services. Secondly, the credit system was
modernised thanks to the separation between long-term and short-term credit that
distinguished commercial banks from industrial banks. The supervision of the
system was then concentrated in the Inspectorate for the defence of savings and the
exercise of credit, chaired by the Governor of the Bank of Italy, but directed by a
ministerial committee led by the Prime Minister. In this way, the 1936 banking
system sanctioned the primacy of politics over banking (Fratianni and Spinelli
1997).
The banking regulation of 1936 remained fundamentally unchanged up till the
1980s and succeeded in supporting the growth of the Italian economy (Battilossi
et al. 2013). It is noteworthy that the banking system improved its allocation
efficiency and became much more stable. Out of the 12 banking crises identified by
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) that occurred in Italy since 1861, ten episodes occurred
before 1936 and, precisely, in 1866, 1868, 1887, 1891, 1893, 1907, 1914,
1921–1922, 1930–1931, and 1935.2 After the World War II, fixed exchange rates
were maintained in the context of the Bretton Woods agreements. The 1950s and the
1960s were characterised by strong economic growth and low inflation. In the
1970s, the end of the Bretton Woods system, oil shocks, and the development of
welfare state created a pressure towards accommodative monetary policies not
compatible with price stability (Fratianni 2011). The main goals of monetary policy
were to stabilise the interest rate and to facilitate the financing of public deficits.
Only towards the end of that decade, the Bank of Italy began paying attention to the
monetary aggregates and gaining independence from fiscal policy. As a result,
monetary policy became less accommodative than before (Tabellini 1988). In 1979,
Italy adhered to the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary
System. Monetary policy independence from the fiscal authority, whose need was
firstly posed by the Governor of the Bank of Italy Paolo Baffi in the 1975, was
reached in 1981 with the ‘divorce’ of the Bank of Italy from the Treasury (Favero
2 The other crises occurred in 1990–1995 and 2008. In their analysis of the Italian financial crises, De
Bonis and Silvestrini (2014) show how episodes of financial distress often reflected previous credit
development; 8 out of 12 banking crises were anticipated or accompanied by the acceleration in the
credit-to-GDP-Gap.
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and Spinelli 1999). It implied that the Bank of Italy was not obliged anymore to be a
residual buyer at the Government’s bonds auctions.
A significant change concerning monetary control was the switch to M2 as an
intermediate target in 1984. It resulted from the intention of the Bank of Italy to
target long-run objectives and to increase its focus on price stability. The anchoring
of the lira within the ERM, despite the necessity of seven realignments of the
national currency, served as a monetary policy intermediate objective, meant to
discipline expectations and to start the lengthy process of building up the anti-
inflationary credibility of policy makers (Sarcinelli 1995). The ERM was abandoned
in 1992 due to unsustainable speculative attacks on the Italian lira. The exit of Italy
from the ERM required a change in monetary policy in order to avoid a spiral
between exchange rate devaluation and inflation. The Bank of Italy thus began to
include a direct precise reference to inflation in its objectives (Gaiotti and Secchi
2012). In the same year, another step towards the central bank independence was
taken, as the Treasury was no longer allowed to borrow from the Bank of Italy.
Moreover, the power to modify the discount rate, previously officially belonging to
the Treasury, in 1992 was formally assigned to the Bank of Italy, sanctioning de jure
independence. In sum, the 1980s and the 1990s marked a change in the monetary
regime. Not only the correlation between public deficits and money creation
disappeared but also the regulatory framework underwent significant changes
(Gaiotti and Secchi 2012). In November 1996, the Italian currency rejoined the
ERM thanks to the introduction of a broader exchange rate band in August 1993.
The lira was the official currency till the end of 2001, as starting from 2002 the
euro was adopted and the ECB became the issuing institution and the reference
monetary policy institution for all the members of the eurozone.
Fratianni and Spinelli (1997, 2001) argue that the monetary policy decisions in
Italy fundamentally responded to the strategy pursued by the fiscal authorities. In
their view, fiscal dominance was the prevailing feature of the Italian monetary
history from 1861 till the 1990s. The dependence of the Bank of Italy on the
Treasury had the effect of keeping low interest rates in order to reduce the costs of
financing budget deficits. Consequently, interest rate targeting rather than monetary
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aggregates targeting was the main operative strategy of monetary policy. In this
view, Italian inflation would be mainly explained by endogeneity of monetary
policy to fiscal policy. The hypothesis of fiscal dominance has been supported by
Favero and Spinelli (1999) and Fratianni and Spinelli (2001). These studies showed
how the influence of public finance on monetary policy, already evident in the
nineteenth century, became stronger after 1936, as the Bank of Italy lost degrees of
independence and the Fascist Government asserted the right to unconditional central
bank financing. Fiscal dominance persisted also after the World War II and
increased during the 1970s, when a significant correlation between budget deficits,
Treasury financing, and monetary base creation existed. Independence, gained with
the divorce of the Bank of Italy and the Treasury, was definitely achieved in 1993
when the Maastricht Treaty, entering into force, imposed drastic cuts to the budget
deficits and abolished all residual forms of direct financing of the Treasury.
The evolution of the circulation of money, as a percentage of GDP is
illustrated in Fig. 2a. The ratio between money in circulation and GDP rapidly
increased after 1861 and then declined, reaching two peaks: in 1919 and in
1944. From 1950 onwards the ratio switched in a range of 5–10 %. Figure 2b
shows the pattern of bank and postal deposits as a percentage of GDP. At the
time of Italian unification, money held in the form of bank deposits was
negligible. However, banks deposits increased steadily till 1934 and then
dramatically fell up till 1947. Subsequently, deposits increased, reaching a peak
in 1978. During the 1980s and 1990s the ratio deposits on GDP declined,
increasing again after 2001.
Figure 3a illustrates the trend of price index, in logarithms, from 1861 to 2011.
Prices were relatively stable from 1861 until the World War I that is during the
period of the gold standard. Two main upward changes in the price levels occurred
during the two World Wars, with the notable exception of the deflation in
1927–1933, and in the 1970s. Figure 3b displays the inflation rate given by the first
difference of the logarithm of the price index. Evident is the stationarity of inflation
around the mean during the international gold standard, the sustained inflation of the
World War I, the subsequent phase of deflation, the dramatic increase during the
World War II and, after a period of stability, the upswing of the 1970s, and the
decline of the following decades.
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Fig. 3 Logarithm of the price index (a) and yearly variation of the index (b). Logarithm consumer price
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3 Related literature
According to economic theory, empirical analyses are generally carried out
assuming that money demand is a function of a scale variable and a vector of
opportunity costs. This is related to the fact that the demand for real money is
intended to be determined by speculative and transaction motives. Therefore, a basic
representation of the long-run money demand can be summarised by the following
function:
M
P
¼ f ðY ;OC; ZÞ ð1Þ
Equation (1) represents real money demand (M/P) as a function of income (Y), of
the opportunity cost (OC),3 and of other possible explanatory variables (Z).
Economic theory suggests that income should have a positive effect on money
holdings. Instead, since by definition the opportunity cost variables measure the
earnings from alternative assets, they should have a negative impact on money
demand.
Many studies have tried to estimate money demand functions in Italy trying to
take into account its major institutional and economic changes. As a result, the
existing literature proposes different and sometimes contrasting evidences.
Muscatelli and Spinelli (1996), with a single equation estimation based on annual
data covering the period 1861–1990, are able to detect one cointegrating relation
and to estimate a stable demand for money for the entire period. The same result is
obtained by Sarno (1999). Following the same approach, Angelini et al. (1993)
estimate a money demand function in Italy for the samples 1975–1979 and
1983–1991, and they find M2 to be stable. Thornton (1998) estimates a stable long-
run money demand function in Italy over the period 1861–1980, by using the
Johansen procedure of cointegration that indicates a unique long-run demand
function for currency and the broad money supply. Finally, Muscatelli and Spinelli
(2000) show how money demand in Italy remained relatively stable notwithstanding
the multiple changes in monetary regimes in the period 1861–1996.
Still, Dooley and Spinelli (1989) raise the issue of stability as a problem for
Italian money demand and this study has been followed by an extensive body of
literature focusing on money demand stability (see Muscatelli and Spinelli 1997;
Juselius 1998; Bagliano et al. 1992). Different methodologies and results are also
presented by Gennari (1999), Bagliano (1996), Rinaldi and Tedeschi (1996), and
Bagliano and Favero (1992). According to Muscatelli and Papi (1990) money
demand instability in Italy can be based in the late changes in the financial system
occurred between the 1970s and 1990s. The demand for money in relationship with
stock market fluctuations, in the period 1913–2003, is examined by Caruso (2006).
He shows that the estimated long-run relations are unstable. Juselius (1998)
attributes these difficulties in the estimation of money demand in Italy to financial
innovations and changes in the exchange rate mechanism in 1983. Also Carstensen
3 See Golinelli and Pastorello (2002) for a survey of the literature estimating similar money demand
equations.
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et al. (2009) present an estimated money demand for Italy that is not stable over
large part of a sample spanning the period 1979–2004.
Therefore, the existing literature does not completely agree on the characteristics
of money demand in Italy. The mixed results may be due to a variety of factors.
These include differences in sample periods, estimation techniques, and in the
measures adopted for the relevant variables. Contributions that fail to identify
stable money demand relations may also suffer from the problem of omitted
variables. The omission of a relevant determinant, such as the effective exchange
rate, could explain the inability to identify a stable money demand function (Lee
and Chung 1995; Bahmani-Oskooee and Shabsigh 1996).
Mundell (1963) is the first arguing that the exchange rate should be considered as
another determinant of the demand for money. Starting from this intuition, there
have been several studies adopting a measure for the exchange rate in the analysis of
money demand (see for instance Dreger et al. 2007; Bahmani-Oskooee and Rhee
1994; Traa 1991; Leventakis 1993; McNown and Wallace 1992; Chowdhury 1995).
Nevertheless, there is no clear empirical evidence of the link between exchange rate
variations and money demand. Some studies show negative coefficients (Rao et al.
2009; Dobnik 2013), while other positive ones (see, for instance, Narayan et al.
2009). These results reflect the theoretical intuition that the reaction of money
demand to exchange rate variations depends on the magnitude of two different
effects: (1) the wealth effect; (2) the expectation/substitution effect. The former
implies that a depreciation of domestic currency raises the domestic currency value
of foreign assets held by domestic residents, which could determine an increase in
the demand for money because it can be perceived as an increase in wealth (see
Arango and Nadiri 1981). According to the latter effect, if a depreciation of
domestic currency results in an increase in expectations of further depreciation, the
public may decide to hold more foreign currency and less domestic money (see
Bahmani-Oskooee 1996; Bahmani-Oskooee and Pourheydarian 1990). Thus, rather
than raising the demand for money, a depreciation could result in a decrease in the
demand for domestic currency. Moreover, since exchange rate volatility could make
the wealth effect or expectation effect uncertain, it could also have a direct impact
on money demand and should, therefore, be considered as another determinant to be
included in the demand for money (see Bahmani and Bahmani-Oskooee 2012;
Mcgibany and Nourzad 1995; Bahmani 2013).
Applications to the Italian case are minimal in the literature. Ewing and Payne
(1999) investigate the incorporation of the exchange rate into the demand for narrow
money equation in several countries including also Italy, but they suggest that
income and interest rate are sufficient for the formulation of a long-run
stable demand for money in Italy. Capasso and Napolitano (2012) focus on money
demand in Italy, but the sample adopted in their paper is considerably shorter than
the one adopted in our study. Furthermore, we also include a measure for exchange
rate variability in our money demand.
By focusing on long-term money stability in Italy, the present study provides
some empirical evidence in order to contribute to this debate, facilitated by recent
development in Italian data availability. To this aim we use also an annual data set
provided by the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) in the special series on the
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150th anniversary of the unity of Italy. These exceptionally long series of data allow
to test the stability of money demand throughout the changes that happened in
monetary policy. Such changes have occurred along the entire sample under
examination, and they could have affected money demand and other monetary
aggregates. Among others, our objective is to fill this gap and to provide a valid
empirical model which can account for the stability of money demand in Italy and
work as a viable tool for policy execution.
4 Empirical analysis
Our empirical analysis on money demand in Italy relies on Eq. (1) as a general
reference. It is performed by adopting both M2 and M1 as proxies for money
demand. In order to estimate money demand and to test for its stability, we conduct
our analysis by means of ARDL estimations and by employing measures related to
income, prices, interest rates, and exchange rates as explanatory variables. Our
methodological choice relies on the fact that error correction models and
cointegration have been jointly applied to determine the features of money demand
both in the short-run and in the long-run. Nevertheless, these analyses require a long
pre-testing procedure and a reasonable large sample of data. Since our data set spans
a very long period of time, we avoid the latter problem. Moreover, by applying the
ARDL approach to cointegration, we circumvent the most common problems
connected with stationarity because this methodology can be applied regardless of
whether the variables are I(0) or I(1). The ARDL approach consists first in
estimating a general distributed lag model in order to pinpoint potential structural
breaks and to establish the suitable significant lags in the variables. Then, it requires
the specification of an error correction model which disentangles long-run dynamics
from short-run disturbances (see Pesaran et al. 2001).
4.1 Data
Our analysis is based on yearly data and spans the period 1861–2011. Based on
different definitions of monetary aggregates, there have been several reconstructions
of the M1 and M2 time series in Italy along the years. Therefore, in reconstructing
the series of monetary aggregates, our aim was to produce homogeneous time series
along the entire period studied. Hence, we identified a ‘base’ definition that is a
compromise between the different definitions of monetary aggregates that have
occurred in Italy over time.
It should be noted that the construction of real monetary aggregates in Italy dates
back to the early 1970s and the publication of the data for the aggregate M1 started
in 1983. The oldest reconstructed series available by the Bank of Italy for M1 and
M2 start in 1936. Therefore, there is a gap between the beginning of the new Italian
Kingdom and the first official data obtainable. In order to fill this gap we use
different sources like De Mattia (1967) (for the period 1861–1889) and De Bonis
et al. (2012) for coins and notes in circulation, postal current accounts, and deposits.
Due to the lack of information, we reconstruct the first period of the two series using
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coins and notes in circulation plus banks and postal current accounts for M1, while
for M2 we add to M1 deposits and postal interest-bearing deposits. In 1985 there
was a first review of the statistics on monetary aggregates in Italy. A note in Banca
d’Italia (1985) clarifies the criteria used to define the tools that make up the new
variables, M1 and M2, and provides a clear definition of the holding sector. At the
end of 1990 there was a second revision of the aggregates that remained valid until
the end of 1998 when, with the start of the third stage of economic and monetary
union, the definition of monetary aggregates passed under the responsibility of the
Council of the European Central Bank. The reconstruction of national accounts was
a project managed by the Banca d’Italia, ISTAT, and the University of Rome ‘Tor
Vergata’ and coordinated by Baffigi.4 It covered the 150-year period following the
political unification of Italy. In this paper we employ the new GDP series at current
prices in millions of euros reconstructed in this project.
De Bonis et al. (2012) provide data on short-term interest rate. The consumer
price index for blue- and white-collar workers households (using as a year base
1913 = 1) is a variable reconstructed with data provided by the Direzione generale
del lavoro (until 1925) and ISTAT (afterwards). For the series of REEX, we
collected the series of the real exchange rate (REX) provided by Di Nino et al.
(2011) and the series of REEX provided by Ciocca and Ulizzi (1990) till 1970, by
Finicelli et al. (2005) till 2005 extended after till 2009. REEX series was then
completed with data till 2011 provided by the Bank of Italy. However, there was
still the problem of the lack of data during the two World Wars. In particular, there
was a missing value in 1919 and 13 missing values from 1938 till 1950 in the REEX
series. Our approach was based on an intuitive analysis. We first checked the
correlation between REX and REEX for the entire available series. We found a high
correlation index of 0.9422. Hence, we calculated the rate of change of REX and
applied this to the REEX series in order to fill the gaps of the missing observations.
We also employed the series of REEX to construct a variable measuring the
volatility of the exchange rate by means of a GARCH(1, 1).
We employ these reconstructed series in order to perform our empirical analysis.
4.2 Money demand equations
We follow the existing literature and model the demand for money according to
Eq. (1) as a function of GDP (Yt), which measures the level of economic activity
and underlines the transaction purpose for holding money, and as a function of the
short-term interest rate (Rt) and inflation (Pt), which influence the opportunity cost
for holding money and allow to consider the speculative motive. Concerning money
demand, we decided to measure it using alternatively M1 and M2. In this way we
are also able to analyse whether the stability of money demand is influenced by the
type of monetary aggregate chosen.
Our reference money demand equation is the following:
4 A very large amount of methodological details about the new series are presented in Baffigi (2013).
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lnMi;t ¼ a0 þ a1 lnYt þ a2 lnRt þ a3Pt þ et ð2Þ
where i can be 1 or 2 in order to indicate M1,t and M2,t, respectively; the coefficients
a1 and a2 represent the elasticities of money demand with respect to income and
interest rate, while a3 is the semi-elasticity of money demand with respect to
inflation.
However, the baseline money demand equation (2) can be augmented by
extending the number of variables. We decided to do this with two other variables
that measure the rate of currency depreciation/appreciation and its volatility.
Considering the first one, we adopt REEX and for the second additional variable we
use a measure of exchange rate volatility as it could make the wealth effect or the
expectation effect uncertain and have a direct impact on money demand. Therefore,
we consider it as another determinant to be included in the money demand function.
Thus, we augment Eq. (2) as follows:
lnMi;t ¼ b0 þ b1 lnYt þ b2 lnRt þ b3Pt þ b4 lnREEXt þ b5VEXt þ mt ð3Þ
where VEXt is the additional variable measuring the volatility of REEX calculated
from a GARCH(1, 1) model. Thanks to the augmented money demand equation (3)
Table 1 Unit root tests
Series Tests
Ng–Perron ADF PP
Ind. eff. Ind. eff. and
time trend
Ind. eff. Ind. eff. and
time trend
Ind. eff. Ind. eff. and
time trend
Levels
Y 1.407 -3.564 0.175 -2.315 -3.474 -2.177
R -6.94* -12.02 -1.915 -1.844 -1.690 -1.505
P -59.88*** -61.30*** -7.682*** -7.689*** -7.738*** -7.693***
REEX -12.46** -19.04** -2.605* -3.375* -2.877* -3.711**
VEX 0.406 -0.015 -5.009*** -5.041*** -16.58*** -16.63***
M1 1.423 -3.910 0.138 -2.197 0.512 -1.878
M2 1.474 -5.068 0.420 -2.130 0.696 -1.831
First differences
Y -28.437*** -33.492*** -4.591*** -4.653*** -4.554*** -4.653***
R -44.947*** -45.369*** -5.511*** -5.547*** -8.763*** -8.979***
P -150.25*** -150.26*** -14.04*** -13.99*** -31.66*** -31.63***
REEX -73.099*** -74.110*** -11.75*** -11.72*** -11.91*** -11.89***
VEX 9.463*** -18.982*** -23.56*** -22.80*** -54.46*** -53.76***
M1 -28.167*** -28.085*** -4.169*** -4.218*** -4.116*** -4.185***
M2 -32.801*** -32.923*** -4.619*** -4.702*** -4.588*** -4.697***
The tests are: ADF Fisher (ADF); PP Fisher (PP) due to Maddala and Wu (1999); Ng_Perron, where the
reported MZa statistic tests the null hypothesis that the variables contain a unit root
M1, M2, Y, R, and REEX are natural logarithms
***, **, and * reject the null at 1, 5, and 10 %, respectively
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we test whether both REEX and its volatility could affect the demand for money and
should therefore be included in the money demand function.
4.3 Empirical results
In implementing our empirical analysis we follow several steps. Firstly, we need to
exclude that the variables considered are I(2) because the ARDL cannot be
employed under this circumstance. The results from Table 1 show that none of the
variables considered is integrated of order 2; therefore, we can proceed to the next
step in which we explore the presence of breaks in the data.
To this aim we run basic OLS regressions of Eq. (2) withM1 andM2 in sequence
as dependent variables and use the recursive residual test to investigate the presence
of breaks in the series and the corresponding number of dummies. The results are
shown in Fig. 4, where recursive residuals are plotted jointly with the zero line ±2
SEs.
The test identifies one impulse dummy for M1 (corresponding to the Second
World War) and two impulse dummies for M2 (corresponding to the two World
Wars). The Chow test for structural breakpoints in the sample of Eq. (2) confirms
that these breaks are significant and decisively rejects the null hypothesis of no
structural change for both M1 and M2 (see Table 2, panel A).
So far we have derived the structural breaks on the basis of the information
obtained from regressing Eq. (2). Since, as shown in Table 1, some of the employed
time series are non-stationary, the estimation results could simply be misleading due
to spurious regressions. Therefore, the identification of structural breaks in the data
requires additional evidence in order to guarantee its robustness. As the Chow test
requires the predetermination of the possible breaks, we also employ the Bai and
Perron (2003) test for multiple unknown breakpoints. We test the null of no
structural change against an unknown number of breaks by employing an F statistic.
The bottom panel of Table 2 displays two structural changes, in 1942 for M1 and in
1943 for M2. Therefore, the results of the Bai–Perron test are consistent with the
results obtained from the Chow test. Once detected the presence of breakpoints in
the data and constructed the dummies in order to correct for the parameters
instability, we turn to the investigation of the long-run and short-run relations
between money demand and its determinants in Italy. To this aim, we estimate an
Fig. 4 Recursive residuals for M1 (left panel) and M2 (right panel)
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ARDL equation and specify the error correction model for Eqs. (2) and (3). It will
allow us to assess whether there is a long-run relation between money demand and
its explicative variables and then to evaluate its stability.
4.3.1 Baseline money demand estimations
Based on the model in Eq. (2), we need a dynamic specification which allows us to
explain the long-run relations, but it is also able to represent the short-run dynamics
in money demand. Therefore, we specify an ARDL model of Eq. (2) in which the
coexistence of level and difference variables allows for studying the short-run and
long-run relations in the demand for money. Thus, we assume an ARDL dynamic
specification of the form:
DlnMi;t ¼ a0 þ a1D42 þ
Xp
j¼1
bjDlnMi;tj þ
Xq
j¼0
c0jDXtj
þ / lnMi;t1 þ h0Xt1 þ lt
ð4Þ
where lnMi,t is the monetary aggregateM1 orM2 (both in logarithms) at time t. Xt is
the vector of explanatory variables, namely: (1) income, lnYt; (2) interest rate, lnRt;
(3) inflation, Pt. D42 is a dummy variable associated with the Second World War
incorporating the statistically significant structural breaks from 1942 to 1947. The
long-run multipliers for the determinants of money demand are given by the vector
of h coefficients, while cj represents the vectors of short-run dynamic coefficients,
Table 2 Structural breaks tests
(A) Chow test for structural breaks
Monetary aggregate Date F statistics
M1 1942–1947 17.06
(0.000)
M2 1919–1920 39.515
(0.000)
M2 1942–1947 33.445
(0.000)
(B) Bai–Perron test for unknown number of breaks
F statistic Critical value
M1 break test
0 versus 1* (1942) 25.66 17.12
0 versus 2 1.169 18.94
M2 break test
0 versus 1* (1943) 20.96 17.12
0 versus 2 1.154 18.94
In panel A, levels of significance in parentheses
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p and q represent the order of the underlying ARDL model, and lt are white noise
errors. We determine the proper lag length for each variable in Eq. (4) by applying
SBC.5 Before proceeding with bounds test we have to test for the goodness of fit of
the ARDL specification (stability, heteroscedasticity, residuals correlation, and
normality). All the specifications employed pass these tests, whose results are added
in the tables reporting the results of the ARDL estimations.
Subsequently, we turn to the investigation of the long-run and short-run effects of
GDP, interest rate, and inflation on money demand. As a first step in order to detect
long-run multipliers and to test for their significance we employ an F test on the null
hypothesis that the coefficients on the level variables are all jointly equal to zero
(Pesaran and Shin 1999; Pesaran et al. 2001). The F statistic is basically a bounds
test on the ARDL error correction model. This test does not rely on the conventional
critical values, but it involves two asymptotic critical value bounds. The critical
bounds depend on the degree of integration of the variables: I(0), I(1), or a mixture
of the two. The critical values for the test are provided by Pesaran et al. (2001). In
the case when the calculated test statistic lies above the upper bound, it implies that
there is a long-run relation between the variables. When the test statistic lies within
the bounds, no conclusion can be drawn without knowledge of the time series
properties of the variables. In this case, standard methods of testing would have to
be applied. No long-run relations exist when the test statistic is below the lower
bound. We estimate the model in Eq. (4), based on the baseline money demand
equation (2), and compute the F test for the null hypothesis h ¼ 0; under the
alternative hypotheses that there is a long-run level relationship between the
aforementioned variables. The bounds test results are reported in Table 3. The null
hypothesis of no long-run relationship is rejected since the F statistic lies above the
0.10 upper bound.
Tables 4 and 5 present the empirical results obtained from the ARDL estimation
(4) of the baseline demand equation (2) for M1 and M2, respectively. Both
regressions fit reasonably well and pass the main diagnostic tests. A key assumption
for the ARDL methodology is that the residuals must be serially independent. The
test statistics in Tables 4 and 5 show that, due to the absence of serial correlation,
we can rely on our ARDL estimations. The results for both monetary aggregates are
in line with theoretical expectations: in the long-run all the components influence
money demand with the expected sign. In particular, almost all level estimates
(Tables 4, 5, sections 2) are highly significant and have also the expected signs.
Compared to the existing literature, the estimated income elasticity for M1 and
M2 is above 1 and differs from the results of Harb (2004) and Kumar et al. (2013),
since their estimated income elasticities are below 1 for different groups of
countries. However, our results are in line with estimated income elasticities in
Capasso and Napolitano (2012) and Muscatelli and Spinelli (2000) for Italy, as well
as Dreger et al. (2007) and Hamori and Hamori (2008) for a large group of
countries. The estimated interest rate elasticity shows the coefficient with correct
negative sign and is also statistically significant at 0.05 for M2, while for M1 the
sign is correct but not significant. It is worth noticing that the estimated interest rate
5 These results can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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elasticity is negative in the great majority of the existing literature. Concerning
previous studies on Italy, our results on interest rate elasticities are similar to the
ones reported in Sarno (1999) and Muscatelli and Spinelli (1996).
The sign of the estimated coefficient for inflation is also in line with what theory
predicts. In both monetary aggregates, M1 and M2, the estimates of the semi-
elasticity of money demand with respect to inflation are negative and significant
(-0.07376 and -0.076636, respectively). These results are consistent with previous
studies on Italy (see, for instance, Capasso and Napolitano 2012; Muscatelli and
Table 3 Bounds test
Equation F statistic Upper critical value [I(1)]
M1 F(4, 141) = 9.1987*** 4.79
M2 F(4, 140) = 8.7376*** 4.79
The F statistic is used to test for the joint significance of the coefficients of the lagged levels in the
ARDL-ECM. Asymptotic critical values are obtained from table CI(iii) case III: unrestricted intercept and
no trend for K = 1 and K = 2 (Pesaran et al. 2001, pp. 300–301)
*** statistic lies above the 0.10 upper bound
Table 4 (M1) ARDL (1, 1, 0, 1) selected based on Schwarz Bayesian criterion
Section 1: Estimated short-run coefficients using the ARDL approach
Lag order
0 1 2
DM1 0.5255***
(0.07163)
DY -0.04648
(0.13768)
0.3423***
(0.11295)
DR 0.014448
(0.01174)
DP 0.000517**
(0.000249)
-0.001438***
(0.000256)
Section 2: Estimated long-run coefficients using the ARDL approach
C Y R P Ec D42
-66.2259***
(4.1812)
1.4744***
(0.26582)
-0.083774
(0.98378)
-0.07376**
(0.028805)
-0.017246***
(0.005542)
12.4699***
(4.7204)
Diagnostics: R2: 0.99837, Durbin–Watson stat.: 1.9372, serial correlation: v2SCð1Þ ¼ 0:12115½0:728;
functional form: v2FFð1Þ ¼ 2:3472½0:126, normality: v2Nð2Þ ¼ 8:0945½0:017, heteroscedasticity:
v2Hð1Þ ¼ 0:028505½0:866
*, **, and *** significance at 10, 5, and 1 %, respectively; standard errors in parentheses. M1, Y, and
R are natural logarithms
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Spinelli 1996), but the estimated coefficients result to be smaller when compared
with previous studies on other countries. Dreger and Wolters (2010), for instance,
find the inflation semi-elasticity to be above 4, which is a very large value in
comparison with our estimations of the inflation coefficient for M1 and M2.
The results from the estimations for the short-run (Tables 4, 5, sections 1)
show the complex dynamics that seem to exist between changes in money
demand and changes in the fundamental variables. Most of the estimated short-
run coefficients are statistically significant and have the expected sign. The
estimated equilibrium correction coefficients (ECM) are -0.0172 for M1 and
-0.0207 for M2 and are statistically significant at 0.01 and 0.05 with the correct
sign. This implies that a deviation from the long-run equilibrium, following a
short-run shock, is corrected by about 1.7 % after 1 year for M1 and the
adjustment process will be at 2 % after 1 year for M2. Finally, Tables 4 and 5
(sections 2) show the results of the dummies used. Dummy ‘42 is statistically
significant at 0.01 and 0.05 levels for M1 and M2, respectively. Overall, our
results are consistent with the main empirical literature regarding Italy and other
developed countries.
Table 5 (M2) ARDL (2, 2, 1, 2) selected based on Schwarz Bayesian criterion
Section 1: Estimated short-run coefficients using the ARDL approach
Lag order
0 1 2
DM2 0.38756***
(0.08026)
0.19981**
(0.07987)
DY 0.057100
(0.12813)
0.40529***
(0.1124)
0.26854**
(0.10394)
DR -0.117814**
(0.052015)
-0.16259***
(0.052391)
DP -0.000336
(0.004182)
-0.000698***
(0.000236)
-0.0011651***
(0.00027)
Section 2: Estimated long-run coefficients using the ARDL approach
C Y R P Ec D42
-65.2458
(3.5142)
1.4494***
(0.26582)
-0.16259**
(0.05239)
-0.076636**
(0.029415)
-0.020709**
(0.006683)
6.5914**
(2.9575)
Diagnostics: R2: 0.99810, Durbin–Watson stat.: 1.9361, serial correlation: v2SCð1Þ ¼ 0:18135½0:670;
functional form: v2FFð1Þ ¼ 0:58904½0:443, normality: v2Nð2Þ ¼ 358:87½0:000, heteroscedasticity:
v2Hð1Þ ¼ 0:61708½0:432
*, **, and *** significance at 10, 5, and 1 %, respectively; standard errors in parentheses. M2, Y, and
R are natural logarithms. Dummy 19–21 has been dropped due to non-statistical significance
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As a final step of our analysis, we evaluate the stability of the estimated money
demand. Firstly, we test whether the estimated ARDL model of Tables 4 and 5 is
stable by checking that all of the inverse roots of the characteristic equation
associated with their models lie inside the unit circle. The results in Fig. 5 show that
the stability condition is satisfied, since the inverted roots are all strictly inside the
unit circle.
Secondly, we perform a formal parameter stability analysis for the ARDL
representation by employing the procedure developed by Brown et al. (1975) (see
also Pesaran and Pesaran 1997). Brown et al. (1975) stability test technique,
CUSUM and CUSUM of squares tests, is based on the recursive regression
residuals. The stability test is conducted by employing the cumulative sum of
recursive residuals (CUSUM) and the cumulative sum of squares of recursive
residuals (CUSUMSQ). Examining the prediction error of the model is another way
of ascertaining the reliability of the modified ARDL model. If the error or the
difference between the real observation and the forecast is infinitesimal, then the
model can be regarded as best fitting.
The CUSUM and CUSUMSQ statistics are updated recursively and plotted
against the break points of the model. It can be assumed that the estimated
coefficients are stable when the plot of these statistics lies inside the critical bounds
of 5 % significance. These tests are usually implemented and interpreted thanks to a
graphical representation and allow us also to evaluate the stability along the years in
the sample covered. In Fig. 6a, c we plot the cumulative sums together with the 5 %
critical lines.
The movement inside the critical lines for both M1 and M2 is suggestive of
parameters stability. Nevertheless, the two CUSUMSQ (Fig. 6b, d) are not always
within the 5 % significance lines, suggesting that the residuals variance cannot be
defined as stable. These results confirm our argument that the banks issue
competition (from 1861 to 1893) did not imply, in itself, a problem of monetary
control and stability in Italy. On the contrary, referring to Figs. 1 and 6, we can see
that the money demand instability period starts together with the Italian banking
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Fig. 5 Inverse roots for equations presented in Tables 4 and 5
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systems evolution (from the beginning of the century till the 1930s), in which the
composition of money started shifting from coins to paper money and bank deposits.
These evolutions and novelties, together with sharply increasing prices (see
Fig. 3a), seem to have reduced the stability of the estimated relations. As also
evidenced by the structural breaks test, the World War I also contributed to money
instability. Therefore, based on the baseline money demand equation (2), we cannot
exclude that money demand in Italy has been unstable.
4.3.2 Augmented money demand estimations
A common practice in the literature on money demand is to augment the basic
equation in order to look for more stable relations, as instability can be due to
relevant omitted variables (see, for instance, Nautz and Rondorf 2011; Foresti and
Napolitano 2013). Therefore, we augment our baseline money demand (2) and re-
Fig. 6 CUSUM and CUSUM of squares tests on Eq. (2). a M1 cumulative sum of recursive residuals.
b M1 cumulative sum of squares of recursive residuals. c M2 cumulative sum of recursive residuals. d M2
cumulative sum of squares of recursive residuals. The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5 %
significance level
Table 6 Bounds test with REEX and VEX
Equation F statistic Upper critical value [I(1)]
M1 F(5, 132) = 10.1476*** 4.261
M2 F(5, 131) = 9.2736*** 4.261
The F statistic is used to test for the joint significance of the coefficients of the lagged levels in the
ARDL-ECM. Asymptotic critical values are obtained from table CI(iii) case III: unrestricted intercept and
no trend for K = 1 and K = 2 (Pesaran et al. 2001, pp. 300–301)
*** statistic lies above the 0.10 upper bound
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estimate it according to Eq. (3). The specification diagnostics in Tables 7 and 8
show values of D–W statistic closer to two, indicating no autocorrelation. Overall,
the additional tests statistics performed for serial correlation, normality of residuals,
functional form misspecification, and heteroscedasticity show no problems in all of
them. The bounds test results are reported in Table 6, and they show that also in this
case, the null hypothesis of no long-run relationship is rejected since the F statistic
lies above the 0.10 upper bound. Then, we perform the ARDL estimation of the
augmented money demand equation (3), by means of the specification (4). In this
case Xt is still the vector of explanatory variables, but it is now composed by: (1)
income, lnYt; (2) interest rate, lnRt; (3) inflation, Pt; (4) real effective exchange rate,
lnREEXt; (5) volatility of REEX, VEXt, respectively.
The ARDL estimations of the augmented money demand equation (3) for both
M1 and M2 are in line with the estimated parameters from the baseline specification
Table 7 (M1) ARDL augmented with REEX and VEX (2, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1) selected based on Schwarz
Bayesian criterion
Section 1: Estimated short-run coefficients using the ARDL approach
Lag order
0 1 2
DM1 1.6337***
(0.085395)
0.69114***
(0.083596)
DY 0.33680***
(0.066351)
-0.27920***
(0.067214)
DR -0.011581
(0.018265)
DP 0.0002656
(0.0002431)
-0.0009613***
(0.0002237)
DREEX -0.0023849***
(0.0007879)
-0.021794**
(0.0095318)
DVEX 20.8965**
(8.2497)
10.8148**
(4.2409)
Section 2: Estimated long-run coefficients using the ARDL approach
C Y R P REEX VEX Ec
37.051
(25.105)
1.0649***
(0.15951)
-0.20178
(0.3178)
-0.012123**
(0.00562)
-0.42129*
(0.23971)
- 1.75606*
(1.05481)
-0.057393***
(0.013470)
Diagnostics: R2: 0.99985, Durbin–Watson stat.: 2.1954, serial correlation: v2SCð1Þ ¼ 3:3007½0:069;
functional form: v2FFð1Þ ¼ 1:7479½0:186, normality: v2Nð2Þ ¼ 497:60½0:000, heteroscedasticity:
v2Hð1Þ ¼ 1:7139½0:190
*, **, and *** significance at 10, 5, and 1 %, respectively; standard errors in parentheses. M1, Y, R, and
REEX are natural logarithms. Dummy 42–47 has been dropped due to non-statistical significance
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(2), but it is worth noticing that the augmented estimation provides a lower elasticity
with respect to income (see Tables 7, 8). Both REEX and VEX coefficients are
statistically significant. This implies that the inclusion of the exchange rate, and its
variability, as additional variables should be taken into account when modelling
money demand in Italy. Concerning M1, the long-run estimated coefficient for
REEX is -0.42129. Therefore, an increase in REEX generates a reduction in the
demand for money. The same kind of effect is generated by an increase in the
variability of the exchange rate, as in this case the estimated impact of VEX on M1
is negative and equal to -1.75606. Similar results are obtained for M2. In this case,
the impact of VEX is considerably higher and this should be due to the fact that this
monetary aggregate is substantially wider and contains elements that are more
sensible to the exchange rate variation. Moreover, the negative sign for the
Table 8 (M2) ARDL augmented with REEX and VEX (2, 2, 1, 1, 0, 0) selected based on Schwarz
Bayesian criterion
Section 1: Estimated short-run coefficients using the ARDL approach
Lag order
0 1 2
DM2 1.3950***
(0.079789)
-0.40382***
(0.078318)
DY 0.26571***
(0.069250)
-0.069905
(0.11552)
-0.18646**
(0.068764)
DR -0.19818***
(0. 053916)
-0.18566***
(0.055011)
DP -0.000534***
(0.000223)
-0.0007384***
(0.000224)
DREEX -0.000365***
(0.0000922)
DVEX -0.098951**
(0.03958)
Section 2: Estimated long-run coefficients using the ARDL approach
C Y R P REEX VEX Ec
-65.2458
(3.5142)
1.0035***
(0.030869)
-0.16259
(0.37021)
-0.023210**
(0.009472)
-0.41605***
(0.13819)
-11.2706***
(3.51912)
-0.020709**
(0.006683)
Diagnostics: R2: 0.70827, Durbin–Watson stat.: 2.1222, serial correlation: v2SCð1Þ ¼ 2:2644½0:132;
functional form: v2FFð1Þ ¼ 4:3773½0:036, normality: v2Nð2Þ ¼ 367:50½0:000, heteroscedasticity:
v2Hð1Þ ¼ 0:22860½0:633
*, **, and *** significance at 10, 5, and 1 %, respectively; standard errors in parentheses. M2, Y, R, and
REEX are natural logarithms. Dummies 19–21 and 42–47 have been dropped due to non-statistical
significance
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coefficient of REEX implies that the expectation/substitution effect dominates the
wealth effect in Italy.
The most important result from the estimation of the augmented money demand
is related to its stability performance. The output displayed in Fig. 7 suggests that,
according to a preliminary analysis, the stability of the estimated ARDL is satisfied,
as all the inverse roots lie inside the unit circle.
In Fig. 8 the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests highlight a clear improvement in
terms of stability of the estimated relations when compared to Fig. 6. The CUSUM
confirms full stability for both M1 and M2. Nevertheless, in this case stability can
also be confirmed for M1 according to CUSUMSQ test. In case of M2, CUSUMSQ
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Fig. 7 Inverse roots for equations presented in Tables 7 and 8
Fig. 8 CUSUM and CUSUM of squares tests on Eq. (3). a M1 cumulative sum of recursive residuals.
b M1 cumulative sum of squares of recursive residuals. c M2 cumulative sum of recursive residuals. d M2
cumulative sum of squares of recursive residuals. The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5%
significance level
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highlights possible instability of the relation in the period 1970–1998. The
instability of money demand in Italy for the period 1970–1990 is a recurrent result
in the literature (see Muscatelli and Papi 1990). With reference to M2, this can be
explained by the sudden increase in money demand for bank deposits before the
1970s, as the Italian banking system evolved substantially, and by the introduction
in the 1970s of the new types of borrowing instruments by the monetary authorities.
The latter involved a shift in portfolio preferences by the private sector which can
make money demand less stable via exchange rate variations. Another interesting
element of this result is that our estimated instability terminates in correspondence
with the adoption of the euro, in which the strong reduction in the exchange rate risk
has probably played a crucial role captured by our augmented money demand
equation. This result also partially confirms the evidence reported in some recent
studies of a stable money demand in the eurozone (see Dreger and Wolters 2010).
We can thus conclude that the estimated money demand equation with the inclusion
of REEX and its variability for M1 is the one that can be confidently defined as
stable. This confirms the evidence in the literature that narrower monetary
aggregates perform better in terms of stability (see Foresti and Napolitano 2014).
5 Conclusions
In the 150 years since national unification, Italy has had a notable process of
economic development. In a century and a half of its history, Italy’s monetary
regime changed, the banking and financial systems evolved becoming more and
more complex, while the country adhered to different exchange rates systems and
experienced banking crises, financial turmoils, and high inflation periods, as well as
shifts in monetary policy arrangements. The first novelty of this paper is related to
the fact that we have been able to cover this entire period, based on the longest time
series adopted in the literature so far. In order to do so, we have reconstructed the
time series for two monetary aggregates (M1 and M2), inflation, real effective
exchange rate, and exchange rate volatility by merging different existing series and
by means of our own calculations.
The reconstructed series have been used together with the existing series for GDP
and short-term interest rate allowing us to cover such a long period of time with an
extensive analysis of money demand determinants. Second, by employing the
ARDL estimations, bounds, CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests, we have contributed to
the literature of money demand stability in Italy by showing that these profound
changes could have affected it and that in order to obtain a stable relation some
adjustments are required. We have shown that instability cannot be excluded when a
standard money demand function is estimated, irrespectively of the use ofM1 orM2
as proxies for money demand in Italy. The estimation based on a standard money
demand function has highlighted that the period of multiple banks of issue (from
1861 to 1893) seems to be characterised by a stable money demand in Italy. Then,
the estimated relations become unstable in the beginning of the century, with the
great development of the banking and financial system, till up the end of the World
War II (1945).
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Subsequently, we have demonstrated that the reason for possible instability
resided in the omission of relevant variables. We have shown that a fully
stable demand for narrow money (M1) can be obtained from an augmented money
demand function, involving the exchange rate and its volatility as explanatory
variables. The same cannot apply to the estimation of M2. On the basis of these
results we have argued that narrower monetary aggregates should be employed as
the proxy for money demand in order to obtain stable estimated relations and also
that estimated unstable money demand can be the result of omitted variables.
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